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Salzburg Manifesto |
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Fighting Europe's Unemployment in the
1990s |
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This manifesto has been issued by a group
of economists brought together by the Egon-Sohmen-Foundation
in Salzburg in late August 1994. The meeting was chaired
by Professor Herbert Giersch, a former head of the Kiel
institute of World Economics and Founding Member of the
German Council of Economic Advisers (1964-1970). The economists
taking part covered a wide range of political spectrum
and came from a variety of personal and professional backgrounds.
The manifesto has been drawn up on the initiative of Professor
Giersch. Most of those present accepted it, but are not
committed to every detail. (September 1994) |
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Fighting unemployment is imperative for economic
as well as humanitarian reasons. Europe could offer gainful
work opportunities to millions of people now on the dole
and produce more valuable goods and services. Discouraged
job seekers, notably among older and young people, would
find a new perspective on life, instead of seeing themselves
separated from society. Once labour is again in high demand,
people will welcome rather than discriminate against new
entrants to the labour force whether from inside the country
concerned or abroad. With the unemployed back at work,
Europe could enlarge its tax base and thus make progress
on its fiscal problems. Higher employment would thus contribute
to European prosperity as well as social cohesion and
co-operation among the EU countries as well as with other
states. |
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All markets work with some stock or reserves.
Present unemployment rates in Europe are however abnormally
high, whether judged by comparison with other periods
or other parts of the industrialised world, such as the
US or Japan. There is no need for such high rates. Labour,
like other resources, is fundamentally scarce in view
of vast potential demands for its use. There is still
a mass of unsatisfied human wants, even in the industrial
West. Environmental requirements make extra claims on
resources and provide an additional reason for available
human labour to be fully and efficiently used. Yet a substantial
part of the labour force is not engaged in meeting this
demand (outside the black economy). |
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The choice between take home pay and leisure
is one for workers and employers to make on a voluntary
basis in the light of preferences and opportunities. Make-work
measures such as compulsory reductions in working hours,
job-sharing or enforced early retirement tend to impoverish
the whole economy and merely tinker with unemployment
statistics. |
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Present unemployment has three proximate
roots: pay and associated labour costs which price workers
out of jobs; intermittent periods of low demand growth;
and capacity shortages which emerge in many countries
during each economic recovery while unemployment is still
high. These elements are interrelated. If labour is too
expensive to employ it will not pay businesses to make
capital-widening investments. Insufficient capacity itself
results in inflationary bottlenecks when employment is
still unsatisfactory. Demand squeezes - whether in response
to inflation, exogenous shocks or simple policy errors
- lead to longer spells of unemployment and, thus, to
workers becoming less easily re-employable (the so-called
hysteresis effect). The most fundamental obstacles are,
however, in the labour market; other remedies will not
work unless pay costs move nearer market-clearing levels. |
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The amount of different kinds of labour that
it pays to employ depends on their prices, which include
both wages and additional non-wage costs. The problem
is that pay is not only a price for the employer. It also
provides most people with their main source of livelihood. |
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There have been forces, such as globalisation
and technical change, which have depressed the market
value of many kinds of labour, especially unskilled workers.
In the USA they have led to severe pressure on the living
standards of the lowest paid workers. In Europe they have
shown themselves in obstinately high rates of long-duration
unemployment. Neither outcome is satisfactory. |
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Under present European conditions the public
interest largely coincides with the interest of unemployed
persons who are being priced out or work. If market-clearing
pay for some workers is below a tolerable minimum, their
fellow citizens should use the tax and transfer system
to top up their income by direct payments. This is a way
of tackling the problems of the least well paid, far superior
to restrictive devices which prevent pay from reaching
market clearing levels, or to restrictions to keep out
imports from poor countries. In contrast to prevailing
protectionist sentiments, we want to express a strong
commitment to an open trading system which enhances the
welfare of both the rich and the poor countries. |
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| A 9-Point Agenda |
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- Appropriate macroeconomic policy can provide a
helpful background for stable growth. Inflationary
dashes for growth should be strictly avoided. Once
inflation is at low levels monetary authorities have
as much responsibility for avoiding nominal demand
deficiency as inflationary excess. In practice the
responsibility for achieving this must be largely
that of central banks. Thus we recommended that the
European Monetary Institute should monitor the development
of nominal GDP at an EU level. This is entirely consistent
with its anti-inflationary responsibilities and will
be worth pursuing irrespective of whether a European
currency is established.
- The key to more jobs lies in following the signals
given by rapid changes in relative prices and sales
conditions which reflect underlying changes in relative
scarcity and opportunities both for workers and for
products. Collective bargaining still prices workers
out of jobs in many parts of Europe. In the years
to come, the level of contractual minimum wages should
not rise in real terms so that productivity growth
can be translated into an expansion of employment.
A growing proportion of the pay packet should be determined
by local labour market conditions and differentiated
according to skill, region, district and place of
operation. The practice of uniform pay increases,
or legislation which generalises collective bargaining
settlements to employers and workers who wish to remain
outside, should be reexamined.
- The power of workers already employed (insiders)
to preserve customary pay scales will not disappear
overnight. Under present conditions the principle
of "equal pay for equal work" stands in the way of
full employment in an economy with fast growth and
structural change. It is desirable to pay newly-hired
persons less - or occasionally more- than those already
in employment, depending upon whether their skills
are ample or in tight supply in the places and regions
where they are needed.
- The wage dispersion required for high employment
in an advanced economy must be sufficiently wide to
encompass the full range of skills and of relative
scarcities. With the move towards an integrated world
economy where unskilled workers are abundant, the
market incomes of such workers in the West will tend
to move nearer those in developing countries. This
is not a cause for panic. First of all, pay scales
in developing countries are already rising and will
rise further. Secondly, the real national income in
advanced countries will benefit from the gains from
trade which should provide a surplus to channel towards
those most hard hit by economic change.
- Ultimately, the best way of reversing the present
widening of market wage disparities is investment
in human capital. The formation of human capital by
education and training should bring its own rewards.
But we should avoid the trap of "credentialism", that
is of inventing more and more paper qualifications
which may have little relevance to future skill requirements.
We are doubtful whether education or training bureaucrats
have a better sense of future labour market requirements
than young people themselves. Intervention in the
training market could take the form of credit vouchers
(to be used for training on the job or in institutions
chosen by the applicant) preferably repayable on concessionary
terms along the lines of student loans. Such credits
should also be available later in adult life, obviously
on a strictly monitored basis.
- The restoration of high employment will require
physical investment as well. We do not recommend generalised
fiscal subsidies which have frequently encouraged
the wrong kind of investment, notably capital intensive
projects. Public policies should be directed towards
removing any existing barriers to capital formation
and the establishment of new firms. The best contribution
that governments could make to encourage capital formation
would be to reduce their own structural budget deficits,
especially by curbing expenditure. No individual European
government can decisively affect world real interest
rates, but the collectivity of European governments
is large enough to have an impact. We would note that
the Japanese current account surplus - provided it
is not achieved at the expense of a depressed economy
- is a contribution to world savings.
- Support for poorer workers in wealthy countries,
provided for reasons of equity or social cohesion,
should be given to them as citizens rather than as
employees. There should be a shift in the emphasis
of the welfare state from dole payments for non-workers
to top-up payments for low-income households. (This
of course implies means tests.) As incomes rise, these
top-up payments should decrease, but by less than
income increases. Recipients who cannot work should
receive a larger transfer than those who are able
to work. (The UK Family Credit scheme is of this type
and worth investigating.) Another useful safety net
would be a fiscal rule providing temporary tax relief
for people returning from spells of unemployment.
- To the extent that long-term unemployment support
is not based on insurance principles but is financed
by general taxes, the link between unemployment benefit
and previous earnings is an undesirable feature of
dubious equity, which increases the minimum reservation
wage below which people will not take jobs. It should
be abolished, as it was in the UK in the 1980s without
any political outcry.
- Legitimate social concerns motivated the Social
Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, but there are risks
that the measures adopted will limit employment and
should be watched carefully in that respect. Some
of the proposed rules, e.g. limiting working hours,
are derived from controversial pre-Maastricht decisions;
so the issue goes well beyond the Treaty itself
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| Conclusion |
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| We put forward these suggestions in the knowledge
that it can take a long time for measures on the supply-side
of the economy to work in reducing unemployment. We therefore
urge their prompt adoption along with supportive non-inflationary
demand policies. If such a balanced approach is soon adopted
there will be a reasonable chance of reducing unemployment
in Europe. |
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Samuel Brittan, UK
Michael C. Burda, Germany
Richard N. Cooper, USA
Herbert Giersch, Germany
Patrick Minford, UK
Karl-Heinz Paqué, Germany
Wolfgang Rieke, Germany
Roland Vaubel, Germany
Charles Wyplosz, France |
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